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Abstract. This article is a continuation of our previous works on the determinants of 
multiple jobs of lecturers in Cameroonian State universities. It lays particular emphasis on 
human resource management used in these universities. The methodology makes use of the 
logit analysis on survey data. The results obtained show that contrary to the theoretical and 
empirical literature, time constraint in the main job does not appear to be an important 
explanatory factor for the multiple jobs phenomenon. However, gender, the universities’ 
location, salary earned from secondary jobs and the holding of an administrative position in 
a university play a major role in explaining the phenomenon. This paper thus presents a 
certain interest linked to the specificity of these jobs (lack of monitoring, opportunism in 
behaviors, social pressures related to them) on the one hand, and the coaching of the human 
resource used on the other. Governmental incentive measures are proposed to limit this 
dual employment phenomenon which tends to deteriorate the quality of lectures provided.  
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1. Introduction  
ultiple job-holding1 is a major characteristic of the labour markets 
of contemporary economies. It refers to a situation where an 
individual holds a main job, along with one or more secondary 
ones. This phenomenon has also been termed moonlighting in the 
literature. The study of moonlighting is important since it captures the 
behaviour of rational economic agents that aim to improve their material 
welfare or develop survival strategies.  
Since the pioneer work of Shishko & Rostker (1976), economic literature 
considers the hours of work in the main job as the major determinant of 
moonlighting (O’Connell, 1979; Krishnan, 1990; Conway & Kimmel, 1995; 
1998; Theizen, 2005). To this major determinant, other determining factors 
such as the pay in the main job and in the secondary job can be added. This 
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study is in line with these pioneering works but however goes beyond the 
classical determinants to consider, in the case of dual job-holding of 
lecturers of State universities in Cameroon, other explanatory variables 
such as gender, localisation, administrative function occupied, highest 
certificate, rank, speciality, age, marital status and child burden.  
During the 80s and 90s, Cameroon went through an economic crisis that 
touched all sectors of activity. Until 1990, the state ensured the growth of 
the budget of higher education that reached 2,1% of the state budget in 
1990. Thereafter, the university system could not be protected from the 
effects of this crisis; drastic reductions in the working budget plunged the 
system into a deep crisis. Within a period of five years, the higher 
education budget was divided by eight. The 1994 devaluation of the CFA 
franc came to worsen the situation. It is therefore not a surprise that the 
university can no longer perform its duty of training and research, in this 
context where lectures are demotivated (suppression of benefits, drastic 
salary cuts, deplorable working conditions). It is in this difficult context 
that the law of 1993 which restructured higher education and opened new 
university structures and is still being enforced today was adopted. Despite 
the growth in their budget allocation observed since 1998, the budget 
remains at a low level and does not enable a proper functioning of these 
institutions ; moreover, the growth in enrolment in universities between 
2000 and 2004 remains higher than that of the university budgets. The 
working budget of higher education represented only 0.8% of the state 
budget in 1999, as against 2.1% in 1990 (Yamb, & Bikoue, 2016).  
These difficult living and working conditions of lecturers of State 
universities2 pushed them to explore and perform other activities out of 
these universities. These lecturers, because of their numerous activities tend 
to give less time and interest to their primary job, a phenomenon that still 
exists today and is increasing in spite of a relative increase in the salary 
level in the civil service3 and a special quarterly research benefit granted by 
the head of state to lecturers of State universities (Yamb, & Bikoue, 2016). 
 This study makes use of a logistic regression model to analyse and 
explain the moonlighting phenomenon. Our model predicts the effect of 
one or more explanatory variables on a qualitative choice variable with two 
responses using a logit model. This model enables us to determine the 
probability of an event given the values of a set of quantitative and/or 
qualitative variables. In other words, we seek to predict the probability that 
a lecturer participates or not in moonlighting as a function of explanatory 
variables like  the pay in the primary job, the pay in the secondary job, 
gender, the situation of the university, the administrative function 
occupied, the highest certificate, the rank, the domain of specialisation, the 
number of working hours in the principal job (average number of teaching 
hours per week and/or average number of courses taught per week), age, 
matrimonial status and the child burden. The main objective of this study is 
therefore to analyse and explain the moonlighting phenomenon by 
lecturers of State universities in Cameroon and establish the relationship 
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between moonlighting and a number of variables that affect it. The case of 
two modalities is explored in this study. In fact, the use of a logistic 
regression model enabled us to model the probability of the occurrence of 
an event given a set of quantitative and/or qualitative variables.  To our 
knowledge in Africa, studies on moonlighting in the educational sector and 
higher education in particular are few. This is really surprising given the 
importance of the sector.   
The second section of this study presents a brief review of the literature 
on the determinants of moonlighting in general and in the higher education 
sector in particular. The survey data as well as some descriptive statistics 
are presented in the third section. The econometric estimation and the 
results obtained are analysed and discussed in section four. Section five 
discusses and highlights the managerial aspects in Cameroonian State 
universities, while advocating recommendations for better use of the 
human resource employed. Section six concludes the study and proposes 
some managerial actions that could help the State reduce the level of this 
phenomenon that could have negative effects on the quality of teaching.  
 
2. Theoretical foundations and literature review  
This section first presents the theoretical foundations of moonlighting 
followed by a brief literature review on the phenomenon.   
 
2.1. Definitions and theoretical foundations 
Moonlighting can be defined as the holding of one or more jobs by an 
individual besides his main job. Two types of secondary jobs can be 
identified (Foley, 1997): formal secondary jobs and informal secondary jobs 
(for example if an individual is engaged in an individual economic activity 
(self employment)).The formal economic activity is considered as a main 
job. This is generally the case when lecturers of State universities who 
besides their activity of lecturing in their main university also lecture in 
other private universities. A third type of secondary activity can be 
considered when an individual besides his main job engages himself in 
agricultural income generating or domestic consumption activities. Given 
that moonlighting is generally a short run phenomenon, the proportion of 
workers who exercise moonlighting at a given moment of their working life 
is high. Many studies on moonlighting do not highlight the characteristics 
of moonlighters and ignore the reasons for and effects of moonlighting. The 
majority of studies on moonlighting (Shisko & Roster, 1976; O’Connell, 
1979; Krishnan, 1990; Paxson & Sicherman, 1996) note the existence of 
many reasons for moonlighting, the main one being work hour constraints 
in the main job that not only limits the possibilities of secondary income 
but also generates income instability.  Another possibility according to 
Kimmel & Conway (2001) is that exercising a secondary job may have a 
non-monetary benefit that is absent in the main job. The main job may 
therefore give many credentials to the worker to have a higher income in 
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the secondary job: this is the case when a law lecturer works as a consultant 
in a law firm, or someone who lectures in the daytime and sings in a 
cabaret at night. The secondary job can therefore offer the worker a 
satisfaction he can’t get from the main job. 
Kimmel & Conway (2001) identify two categories of moonlighters with 
different labour supply characteristics: the first group is made up of 
workers who exercise different activities or have heterogeneous job motives 
while the second is consists of workers who exercise the same activity in 
the secondary job (job packaging motive). It should be noted that the 
reasons for the practice of any of these activities are different. 
Heterogeneous activities in the secondary job are specific in that they are 
conditioned by the work hour constraints in the main job. This has as effect 
a lower income in the secondary job relative to the main job for shorter 
periods than in homogeneous activities. This is explained by the fact that 
time constraints in the supply of labour are generally perceived as a short 
run phenomenon that can have different effects depending on the type of 
secondary job. Thus, a lecturer can have different types of secondary 
activities (consultancy, management of production or sales companies, 
senior employee in a ministry, provider of varied services, farmer, etc…), 
or the same secondary activities in line with the main job (lecturer or 
researcher in another private or state university). 
According to Kimmel & Conway (2001), the majority of moonlighters 
are into services and sales but also occupy technical and professional 
positions. In 37% of cases, the positions occupied by moonlighters are the 
same as those in the main job. The study by Foley (1997) on moonlighting 
in Russia during the economic transition period shows that about 87% of 
moonlighters have secondary jobs that are different from their main job 
unlike in the United States where these percentages are 83% and 77% 
respectively for men and women (Paxson & Sicherman, 1996). The same 
study shows that secondary jobs in the health, education, sales and mines 
are more likely to be the same as the main job. The most practiced 
secondary jobs are in the domains of teaching, petit trading and services 
like cleaning.  
According to Foley (1997), the reasons for exercising a secondary job in a 
sector different from that of the main job lie in the fact that workers can 
plan to change their profession without necessarily quitting their main job 
and that a secondary job is some sort of insurance against fluctuations in 
income in the main job. Also, work hour constraints in the main job can 
incite workers to seek for secondary jobs that give them the possibility of 
working in the evenings or during week-ends. The majority of secondary 
jobs are informal, suggesting that an easy accessibility and the control of 
the time worked are factors that affect the choice of the individual.  
The determinants of moonlighting differ according to the sector 
considered. However, the literature identifies on the one hand the common 
socioeconomic determinants that don’t depend on the sector studied. These 
determinants are age, sex, matrimonial status, number of children at the 
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care of the worker, level of education, professional qualifications or 
dexterity, etc… on the one hand and budgetary determinants, particularly 
salary and non salary incomes and work hour constraints on the main job 
on the other. Some of these determinants are discussed in the rest of the 
study.  
 
2.2. Literature review 
Pioneers research on moonlighting recognised the possible existence of 
many reasons, but empirical studies make the hypothesis that all 
moonlighters have hour constraints in their principal job (Shishko & 
Rostker, 1976; O'Connell, 1979; Krishnan, 1990, 1993). 
The literature before the study by Shishko & Rostker (1976) treated 
moonlighting following a demand and supply approach. Certain supply 
based studies (Moses, 1962 and Perlman, 1969) explain the individual 
labour supply of a moonlighter while others based on demand (Guthrie, 
1965, 1969; Grossman, 1974; Hamel, 1967) highlight the demographic 
characteristics of a typical moonlighter. Shishko & Rostker (1976) have the 
merit of combining these two approaches to estimate the supply curve of a 
moonlighter thanks to the tobit model. 
However, more recent studies highlight the reasons of moonlighting and 
answer questions on the implications of these reasons for economic 
moonlighting models. As example, Conway & Kimmel (1994) estimate a 
moonlighter labour supply model for men in their youth using data from 
the Income and Programme Participation survey (ERPP). In their model, 
they identify many reasons for moonlighting. They particularly find that 
the number of hours spent in the principal job become endogenous if the 
labourer is moonlighting for reasons other than hour constraints in the 
principal job.  
In line with these studies, Conway & Kimmel (1995) use ERPP data to 
estimate a duration model of moonlighting. They make the hypothesis that 
the moonlighter with a work hour constraint in the principal job will hold 
many jobs for a lesser period than those who exercise moonlighting 
because both jobs are heterogeneous. Levenson (1995) provides an indirect 
proof of moonlighting. He notes that during the 25 years preceding his 
study, moonlighting led to salary and employment benefits by men but 
that the participation of women in moonlighting is increasing faster than 
that of men. This may be an indication that female participation in 
moonlighting is for non-economic reasons. However, Levenson does not 
test this hypothesis formally. Paxson & Sicherman (1994) study the 
dynamics of moonlighting in the United States by jointly using data from 
the current population survey (ECP) and the Panel Dynamic Income 
Survey (EPRD). They find that moonlighting is a dynamic process – most 
workers surveyed practiced moonlighting during their working life. The 
EPRD data reveals that between 1979 and 1989, almost 65% of men and 
43% of women had a second job. They also note that traditional 
moonlighting models suppose that workers practice moonlighting because 
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of hour constraints in the main job, ignoring the fact that with time, 
workers can evade these hour constraints and look for new jobs. The focus 
of their study is on the reasons why workers join or quit secondary jobs. 
They specify and estimate a joint decision: to look for a secondary job or to 
quit the primary one for another that has no hour constraints. Abdukadir 
(1992) examines the possibilities of moonlighting being the outcome of 
short run financial constraints.  
Ehrlich (1973), Shishko & Rostker (1976); Conway & Kimmel (1998) 
explain moonlighting using the salary differential between the formal and 
informal sector, the latter giving more profit opportunities for a given level 
of risk. Krishnan (1990), Paxson & Sicherman (1996), Ahn & Rica (1997) 
analyse moonlighting as the result of the degree of under-employment or 
hour constraints in the main job. From this last point of view, these authors 
adhere to the views of the empirical works of other economists on the same 
reasons (O’Connell, 1979; Krishnan, 1990, 1993; Shishko & Rostker, 1976).  
Rose (1994), Kim (2005), Desai & Idson (2000), Braithwaite (1994), Foley 
(1997) and Kolev (1998) show that moonlighting is for two main reasons: 
survival and the spirit of entreprise, especially in transition economies, 
reference being made here to Eastern Europe. Guariglia & Kim (2004) note 
that the probability of moonlighting increases with the level of training. 
Commander & Tolstopiatenko (1997) explain moonlighting by individuals 
using the demand for factors, especially labour. According to them, firms 
have a choice between informal part time jobs (black market labour) and 
informal4 fulltime ones.  
In the teaching field, the causes and consequences of moonlighting by 
lecturers have been highlighted by many authors. These causes and 
consequences of the phenomenon have led some authors to bring out a 
typical moonlighter profile, financial need (Parham & Gordon, 2011; 
Winans, 2005) being one of the main reasons why lecturers engage in 
moonlighting and use it as to explore other career options (Winans, 2005). 
A study carried out in the state of Texas in the United States (TSTA, 
2006) reveals that 67% of lecturers questioned on the phenomenon are of 
the opinion that moonlighting has had a negative impact on their 
professional life and performance. Henderson, Darby & Maddux, (1982); 
McGinley, (1979); Wisniewski & Kleine (1984) show that moonlighting not 
only reduces the performance of lecturers but is also a threat to the 
professional status of this job.  
Parham & Gordon (2011) analyse the negative effects of moonlighting on 
lecturers through the hour constraints in the secondary job. For these 
authors, moonlighting does not only affect the professional life of lecturers, 
but also their family life and their health. However, in the light of growing 
financial needs, lecturers cannot give up moonlighting in spite of its 
negative effects. These same authors hold that one of the causes of 
moonlighting by lecturers also lies in the fact that these lecturers have for 
some time developed a complex towards their profession, considering it as 
a profession at different degrees of their status of lecturer. Is it for this 
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reason that lecturers have began engaging in moonlighting, or do they do 
this simply for economic survival? 
Carolyn, et al., (1994) rather lay emphasis on socio demographic 
characteristics of moonlighters in higher education (gender, highest 
certificate, wage, age, etc…) to bring out the profile of a typical moonlighter 
(young, mostly of male sex, and with many certificates). These lecturers are 
it appears not satisfied with their pay in the principal job. These authors 
finally reach the conclusion that these lecturers differ only slightly from 
their colleagues who are reticent as concerns moonlighting in the majority 
of factors associated to work (job satisfaction, quota and work hour 
constraint, stress at work) and attitudes (towards the job of lecturer, of 
students, of parents and the administration). Also, the moonlighter does 
not seem unsatisfied with his job.  
 However, although recent research has began studying moonlighting 
more rigorously, little is known on the reasons underlying this behaviour 
in Africa in general and Cameroon in particular. Nevertheless, Yamb & 
Bikoue (2016) used a log linear model to highlight the factors that explain 
the moonlight phenomenon among lecturers in Cameroonian State 
universities. This study is important because it shows, in addition to 
moonlighting classical determinants, (hours of work in the main job, pay in 
the primary job, pay in the secondary job) that gender and the university 
localization also play major roles. The present study that uses a logistic 
model can therefore be seen as a continuation of their work, by stressing on 
the phenomenon’s managerial implications, as well as on the State 
universities` managers on the one hand, and on lecturers on the other.  
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1. Sample characteristics and description of study variables 
This study analyzes the multiple job-holding phenomenon of lecturers 
of State universities in Cameroon by using data on two of the eight State 
universities in the country; an urban university (University of Douala) and 
a semi-urban university (University of Dschang) were selected for the 
study. The reasons of the choice of the universities of Douala and Dschang5 
lie in the fact that the first is representative of large metropolitan 
universities (universities of Yaoundé 1 and Yaoundé 2) whereas the second 
is representative of small metropolitan universities (universities of Buea, 
Bamenda, Ngaoundéré and Maroua). In fact, the economic and 
demographic characteristics of the large metropolis are almost similar, just 
as are those of the small metropolis (Yamb, & Bikoue, 2016).   
 In each university, a survey was carried out and a random sample 
stratified by zone, gender, income and hour constraint was constituted on 
the basis of approximately 240 administered questionnaires of which 169 
were returned, giving a rate of return of almost 70%. On the 169 received 
questionnaires, 138 were administered on men and 31 on women, 94 
respondents being of Douala and 75 of Dschang. The Table 1 in the 
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appendix section summarises the distribution of the lecturers questioned 
by gender, rank and university of origin.   
The first column of this table represents the variables rank and 
university of origin; the second column which represents gender is divided 
into two columns namely male and female; the last column presents the 
total number of lecturers surveyed by rank and this according to the 
university of origin and gender; the figures below the frequencies represent 
the corresponding proportions; for example, we will say that the sample 
comprises 52 senior lecturers (which accounts for approximately 30,8% of 
the total of the sample) distributed in an equitable way in the two 
universities (50% in each institution) that is to say 18 men (69,2%) and 8 
women (30,8%) senior lecturers in Douala and 25 men (96,2%) and a 
woman (3,8%) senior lecturers in Dschang.    
 
3.2. Dependent and independent variables  
The explanatory variables used within the framework of this study are 
those resulting from the traditional literature on moonlighting. The 
majority of them enable us to capture the socio-economic characteristics of 
the lecturers and to simplify the analysis were each classified in two 
categories: the current wage condition (adequate, inadequate) taken as a 
proxy for the wages in principal employment,  the weekly workload of 
courses (less than 10 hours, greater than 10 hours) taken as proxy for time 
constraint in principal employment, the income earned in the secondary 
employment (consistent, inconsistent), the gender (male, female), the zone 
of localisation of the University (Douala, Dschang), the occupation of an 
administrative office (yes, no), the highest diploma (no doctorate, doctorate 
and more), the rank (master, non master), the speciality (social/human 
sciences, sciences/technology), age (42 years and below, more than 42 
years), the matrimonial status (married, single), the child burden (less than 
five, five and more).  Lastly, for the explained variable we asked the 
surveyed a question to which it was necessary to answer by yes or no: Do 
you exercise other activities apart from your activities of teaching and research at 
the university? This was retained as a proxy of the variable multiple job-
holding. 
 
3.3. Some descriptive statistics  
Firstly, when we ask the university lecturers surveyed their point of 
view concerning their present wage situation, whatever their gender or 
university of origin, a high proportion answers that it is inadequate (see 
tables 2 and 3 in the appendix section).    
From table 2, we see that among the 169 surveyed lecturers, 102 find 
their current wage situation is inadequate, giving approximately 60% of the 
sample size and of the 138 questioned men, 90 are of the same opinion, 
giving a percentage of approximately 65%. 38,7% of the 31 women are of 
the same opinion. However, we note that a rather considerable percentage 
(nearly 22% of the sample) of surveyed had no opinion about the question. 
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When we set aside this percentage in our estimates and even when we 
incorporate the first two columns, we note a high increase in the proportion 
of the people who believe that their current wage condition is inadequate at 
the global level (approximately 77%) and at the level of the gender 
(approximately 78% of the men and 70% of the women). This same 
reasoning holds when we consider table 3 as far as the university 
localisation’s zone is concerned. In fact, by ignoring the last column and 
incorporating the first two, 77% of lecturers surveyed find their current 
wage situation inadequate and at the level of the universities, we obtain the 
same result for almost 70% of the lecturers of the University of Dschang 
and 83% for those of Douala.  From these statistics, can one conclude that 
wages in main employment are one of the key factors in the explanation of 
multiple job-holding by lecturers of state universities in Cameroon?   
 
4. Econometric estimation of the determinants of 
multiple job-holding: analysis of results and discussion   
4.1. Econometric model 
To highlight the moonlighting phenomenon of lecturers of state 
universities in Cameroon, we make the hypothesis that each lecturer can be 
confronted or not to multiple job-holding and that the propensity to be 
confronted with multiple job-holding is related to the characteristics of the 
individual and the administration. The dependent variable here is multiple 
job-holding, measured by a nominal variable. This enables us to capture the 
characteristics of the individuals and the administration through a logistic 
regression model of the form:  
 
, 1k i n j i jMoonlighting X Zµ β θ ε= + + + =∑ ∑   If Moonlighting            (1) 
                                                                             = 0 Otherwise 
With:  
iX : a vector of K characteristics of the individual i (age, gender, 
matrimonial status, child burden, highest diploma, speciality, rank, wages 
resulting from the secondary employment)  
jZ : a vector of N characteristics of the administration (function occupied 
by the individual i, wage in the principal job, hour constraints in the 
principal job, localisation of the university)    
,i jε : a random error term which follows a white noise    
Table 4 in the appendix section presents the variables used and their 
coding. Likelihood ratio tests are also performed on the variables to 
determine those that have a significant effect on moonlighting (see table 5 
in the appendix section).   
  
4.2. Analysis of results and discussion  
Table 6 in the appendix section presents estimates of a non parsimonial 
version of equation 1 for the set of variables above and information on the 
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quality of the adjustment of the model which show that the model retained 
for the analysis is correctly specified. This is confirmed by the likelihood 
ratio test on the chi-square statistic.  
Work hour constraints in the main job appear in the literature as the 
main determinant of moonlighting. It is captured in this study by the 
variables number of lecture hours and number of courses taught per week. 
The coefficients of these variables are negative and non significant showing 
that work hour constraints are not determinants of moonlighting. The odd 
ratios obtained for the two variables are less than 1, showing that lecturers 
with a lower work load (a lower working hour constraint) are more 
prepared to practice moonlighting than those with a higher work load (a 
higher working hour constraint) in the main job. However, the literature 
holds that the main reason for the search of a secondary job is the lower 
working hour constraint in the main job. University lecturers generally 
have many possibilities of exercising a secondary job because of their time 
tables. They therefore view secondary jobs as a means of gaining income 
during their spare time offered them by their main employer, the state. 
Another justification of the result obtained lies in the fact that work hour 
constraints are almost absent in the case of lecturers of state universities 
since they have a fixed salary that does not depend on the number of hours 
lectured. They are not paid per hour as supposed by the work hour 
constraint hypothesis. The income in the main job is not conditioned by the 
number of hours worked. It is instead in the secondary job that the 
hypothesis of work hour constraint is strong since the lecturer is paid 
according to the number of hours worked. Given the salary conditions in 
the main job, we see that unlike the predictions of most studies in the 
literature, the variable work hour constraint in the main job does not 
determine multiple job holding. The hypothesis of work hour constraint 
does not therefore hold in the case of lecturers of state universities in 
Cameroon.   
According to Kimmel & Conway (2001), budgetary factors impact on the 
holding of a second job. In fact, when salary and non-salary incomes are 
high, the probability of holding a second job reduces, a result that is in line 
with work hour constraint in the main job hypothesis (Shisko & Rostker, 
1976). Our results, although being non-significant rather show that 
lecturers who declare having an adequate salary income have 19% more 
chances of holding a secondary job than those who declare their income is 
inadequate, thus contradicting theory. In fact, the odd ratio here is 1.19 is 
not significantly different from 1 and an odd ratio of 1 would imply that 
whatever the level of income in the main job, the probability of holding a 
secondary job remains the same. This is justified by the low levels of 
salaries and difficult working conditions faced by these lecturers daily. The 
income from a secondary job is therefore perceived as an additional income 
to improve their living conditions since without this secondary job, their 
level of poverty will be higher (Kimmel & Conway, 2001). 
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The traditional literature on multiple job holding considers socio-
demographic variables like age, education, child burden and domain of 
specialisation as important determinants of moonlighting through the use 
of discrete choice models (Kimmel & Conway, 2001). These variables 
significantly affect the choice of an individual to take a second job or not. 
Why does this study contradict some of these results? The answer lies in 
the fact that we are working in a different environment and on a 
‘homogeneous’ population-that of university lecturers. The ‘heterogeneous’ 
nature of the population in previous studies is the main reason behind 
these different results. In fact, in this ‘homogeneous’ population made up 
of lecturers of state universities, all the individuals have a high level of 
education. Is this high level of education a determinant of multiple jobs 
holding as suggested by the literature? At first sight yes. But given the 
current state of university lecturers in Cameroon, this is not the case. Given 
that the level of education is measured using the certificates obtained 
(Masters, Ph.D., Post Doctorate degrees) and the rank (ATER, assistant 
lecturer, senior lecturer, associate professor and professor), each showing a 
minimum of 17 years of study for the different categories. According to the 
literature those with a higher level of education are more inclined to 
holding multiple jobs than those with a lower level. Our results show that 
the estimates of these two variables are not significant, showing that the 
level of education is not a significant determinant in the search and exercise 
of a secondary job. In fact, the certificate and/or grade does not affect the 
holding of a secondary job. This can be explained by the fact that the 
activities performed at the level of the main job (lecturing) are the same or 
almost the same in the secondary job. Another reason is the shortage of 
lecturers in higher education, given the ever growing number of state (08) 
and private universities (close to 200). However, despite the non 
significance of the variable level of education measured using the certificate 
and grade, we obtain negative coefficients and odd ratios less than 1 which 
is in line with certain theoretical contributions according to which lecturers 
with a higher level of education are more inclined to moonlighting than the 
others. (Guariglia & Kim 2004; Kimmel & Conway, 2001; Foley, 1997). Still 
in line with these authors, a higher level of education (in this case 
measured by the grade) leads to a higher hourly wage in the secondary job. 
For example, a professor will have a higher hourly wage than an assistant 
lecturer, thus confirming the result according to which a professor has 
about 2.71 times more chances than the assistant lecturer. But this does not 
mean that the professor or assistant lecturer will be more inclined to hold a 
secondary job given the non significant nature of the variable grade. In line 
with Foley (1997), our results show that age does not significantly influence 
moonlighting on the one hand, and that age is negatively correlated with 
moonlighting in line with Kimmel & Conway (2001) on the other (for the 
latter, age is a significant factor, unlike for the former). According to our 
estimates, younger lecturers have about 66% more chances of holding a 
secondary job than older ones. In fact, the youngest lecturers (considered 
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the most energetic) have a propensity to better cope with moonlighting. 
Older lecturers will also moonlight, but to a lesser extent in view of 
ensuring a better retirement for themselves. In fact, as suggested by 
Kimmel & Conway (2001) through their model on the duration of 
moonlighting, moonlighting is an inter-temporal phenomenon that reduces 
or even disappears with time and whose income has a significant impact on 
the level of poverty.  
 The majority of studies on multiple job holding attach a certain 
importance to the speciality of individual and the sector activity in the 
exercise of a secondary employment. The technical and professional sectors 
are often the most requested. Foley (1997), Kimmel & Conway (2001) hold 
that not only are these sectors among the most requested for Moonlighting, 
but also that the majority of those that find themselves in these sectors 
undertake the same activity in the main job. They conclude that the 
probability of exercising a secondary employment when one has a 
technical/professional qualification is higher. Our estimates, in spite of their 
non significance confirm these results. In fact, the lecturers of the technical 
or technological fields have approximately 28% more chances of exercising 
a secondary employment than those of other sectors. This is explained by 
the fact that the state universities and institutes private higher education 
establishments put more and more emphasis on the creation and 
management of technical and technological trainings than tertiary ones. 
Since lecturers of the technological fields are fewer, they are more 
demanded than the others (social and human sciences) who constitute a 
large share of lecturers and thus have more chances of exercising one or 
more jobs in addition to their main employment.  
In the literature, having children has an ambiguous effect on 
moonlighting: thus, a high number of children increases the probability of 
having a secondary employment whereas to having children of a very 
tender age (corresponding to the nursery school children) reduces this 
probability (Kimmel & Conway, 2001). Our estimates show that the 
number of children does not affect the moonlighting. However, the positive 
coefficient of the variable number of children and its odd ratio close to 1 
simply shows that people with a higher number of children have the same 
propensity to moonlight as those with a lower number. This can be 
explained on the one hand by the relatively low level of wages compared to 
other lecturers in countries at the same level of development (Ivory Coast, 
Senegal, Congo, Kenya…) and on the other hand by the low difference in 
wages between the various ranks of the teaching corps. The non 
significance of the majority of our estimates compared to results in the 
empirical literature on multiple job holding is due to the homogeneous 
nature of the population on which we work as previously indicated. 
However, in spite of this non significance, the signs    of the majority as of 
these coefficients are in line with the majority of studies in the empirical 
literature on the relationship between moonlighting and its determinants. 
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The results of the estimation of the parsimonious model are presented in 
table 7. At the level of the characteristics of the individual, we find that 
only two variables explain moonlighting to a significant level: These are the 
income resulting from the secondary employment and gender. Two 
variables are also significant at the level of the characteristics of the 
administration: These are the variables University of origin and the holding 
of an administrative office. The parsimonious model is thus given on the 
basis of these four variables.  
In the light of these results, we see that lecturers of university of Douala, 
lecturers who have an administrative office, lecturers whose incomes resulting from 
the secondary employment are not consistent and male lecturers have a greater 
tendency to practice moonlighting. 
According to Foley (1997), men and those who reside in urban 
environments are more inclined to multiple job holding, thus confirming 
our results: multiple job holding is therefore more justified in Douala than 
in Dschang since Douala is the economic capital of Cameroon and has more 
private university institutions (more than 40% of the private university 
institutions of the country are found in Douala) and more companies. 
Approximately 80% of the economic activity of the country is concentrated 
in this city. According to our estimates, a lecturer in Douala has 
approximately 4,95 times more chances (e1,6   = 4,95)6  than his counterpart 
of Dschang to exercise one or more jobs in addition to his main 
employment.   
For Levenson (1995), women practice moonlighting more than men. Our 
results rather show the contrary and are in line with those of Carolyn et al., 
(1994) and Foley (1997) on the ``Typical Moonlighter’’ as concerns gender: in 
fact, the socio-cultural context makes of the woman the manager of 
domestic activities and the education of the children. This reduces the time 
she can devote to auxiliary activities, apart from the main job, thus 
confirming our results on gender which show that men have 
approximately 2.86 times more chances to devote themselves to auxiliary 
activities than women. 
The holding of an administrative office, according to our estimates has a 
positive effect on moonlighting. The holding of an administrative office in 
the university by a lecturer does not eliminate his aversion for risk. The 
administrative position can get him functional allowances whose payment 
is random. The lecturer will thus prefer a sure income resulting from 
another employment to the hope of an uncertain income which the 
administrative office procures him, even if the incomes resulting from these 
allowances are higher than those from the secondary employment. This 
secondary employment allows him, as the theory of the implicit contracts 
(Azariadis & Stiglitz, 1983) suggests, to absorb uncertainty. The estimate of 
the characteristic administrative office consolidates this theory of contracts 
since we find that the lecturers who occupy an administrative office have 
approximately 3 times more chances to find themselves in moonlighting 
than those who do not occupy such offices.  
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When the incomes resulting from the secondary employment are not 
consistent, the tendency to exercise other jobs is higher than when these 
incomes are consistent. In fact, in State universities, lecturers generally 
enjoy a particular status. They benefit from an ensured employment which 
generally makes difficult their dismissal. This employment insurance gives 
them an appreciable margin of freedom to undertake secondary activities 
besides their job in the state universities. This state of mind is more 
reinforced when the incomes resulting from the secondary activities are not 
consistent. Thus, lecturers finding themselves in this situation will have a 
higher tendency hold multiple jobs in order to reach the levels of income 
considered as consistent. The results on the variable income from the 
secondary job show that those whose incomes resulting from the secondary 
activities are not consistent have approximately 5,17 times more chances to 
continue to exercise more secondary jobs  than those whose incomes 
resulting from the secondary employment are considered to be consistent.    
We finally note that the majority of the results obtained on the variables 
retained for this study confirm the hypothesis according to which financial 
need is the main reason why lecturers of State universities of Douala and 
Dschang to exercise multiple job holding (Parham & Gordon, 2011; Winan, 
2005). This is due particularly to the strong social or Community pressures 
which are exerted on the university lecturer in the African context. The 
lecturer is generally perceived as a person having important material and 
financial means that should be put at the disposal of the community. To 
meet these requirements from the community, the lecturer is obliged to 
exercise moonlighting (Yamb & Bikoue 2016).  
After applying the logit approach to a sample of 169 lecturers from two 
state universities, the results show that the localization of the university, the 
holding of an administrative office, incomes resulting from the secondary 
employment, and gender are the significant factors of moonlighting by lecturers of 
the state universities of Douala and Dschang.     
 
5. Management of lecturers in state universities 
Lecturers’ management in Cameroonian State universities has certain 
shortcomings, at least at three levels: first, in the control of teachers’ 
behavior, secondly in the setting up of an efficiency wage or remuneration 
per hour of work, and finally at the level of the mobilization of the human 
resource employed.  
 
5.1. On the control of the behavior of lecturers 
If a payment system has as aim to influence the behaviour of the 
employee, the particular goal is to encourage him to work, or to dissuade 
him from "cheating", i.e. from adopting an "immoral" behaviour 
(Stankiewicz, & Lene, 2011). Summarily, it is a question for a company of 
controlling not only the risk or the moral risk (moral hazard) but also the 
risk of adverse selection. In fact, it is desirable that the management device 
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serves to attract and preserve the best elements (Lazear, 2004). Obviously, 
the system of remuneration set up by the State does not seem to play this 
role. This system does not encourage the lecturers to give best of 
themselves in their main employment or dissuade them from cheating or 
developing opportunistic or free rider behaviours. The control of the 
allocation of lecturing periods by rank is far from systematic. Some State 
lecturers suffer under the weight of a workload high work load in the 
universities whereas others don’t do their job. This situation opens the way 
to moonlighting for the latter category of lecturers.  
 
5.2. The implementation of efficiency wages or remuneration per 
hour of work  
It is a question of knowing if there is a level of wages that allows the 
lecturers to concentrate only on their main employment? We can partially 
say yes. We would then qualify these wages as efficiency wages (ѡ*) i.e. 
wages higher than the income the lecturers could obtain elsewhere (a). In 
other words, it is a question of granting the lecturer a rent equal to (ѡ*- a). 
The wage ѡ* is described as "efficient" because it is that which generates the 
highest productivity (effort per FCFA spent): it is thus the most 
"mobilizing" level of wages as termed by Stankiewez & Léné (2011). 
However the payment of efficiency wages to the lecturer does not 
guarantee his non participation in secondary activities. In fact, since a 
lecturer normally offers his annual time allocation of lectures in addition to 
the time devoted to research, the remaining time can be allocated to income 
generating activities. An hourly remuneration of the lecturers in the State 
universities at a substantial rate followed by an effective monitoring (for 
example setting-up a biometric check of the hours lectured) would reduce 
the propensity to exercise a secondary employment. The time constraint 
would then fully play its role and would better explain the tendency for the 
latter in to engage in Moonlighting  
 
5.3. Problem of the mobilisation of human resources   
In the management of human resources, managers of State Universities 
should show a particular interest on points such as the mobilization, 
organisation and training of the human resources employed from the point 
of view of action and the understanding of the operation of the university 
system as a whole. Not only should the lecturers have aptitudes and 
abilities, still it is necessary for them to use these well and apply them for 
the benefit of the universities. This is only possible by motivating them 
and/or by involving them in the operation and the management of the 
university institutions and in decision-making at all levels. 
 
6. Conclusion and future research avenues 
The main objective of this study is to analyse and explain the 
moonlighting phenomenon by lecturers of State Universities in Cameroon 
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by highlighting the managerial aspects in these universities, for a better use 
of the human resource employed. We used a logistic regression model 
which enabled us to predict the probability that a lecturer engages himself 
or not into moonlighting. Our analysis shows that the localisation of the 
university, the holding of an administrative office, incomes resulting from 
the secondary activities and gender better explain  the moonlighting 
phenomenon  of lecturers of State universities in Cameroon. The study data 
shows that multiple jobs holding by lecturers of State universities 
deteriorate the quality of the lessons delivered (Henderson, Darby & 
Maddux, 1982; Mc Ginley, 1979; Wisniewski & Kleine, 1984), this because of 
the absence of efficiency wages i.e. wages higher than the income the 
lecturer could obtain elsewhere.   
To try to reduce the size of this phenomenon, the State should set up a 
system of incentives centred on three main points: firstly, create a working 
environment that allows the lecturers to largely devote themselves to their 
activities of teaching and research. In fact, in the majority of the 
Cameroonian State Universities, only a minority of lecturers having 
administrative responsibilities have offices in the university campus. The 
consequence is that most of the lecturers are bored in the campus at the end 
of a course or between two courses, and tend to go to sell their know-how 
elsewhere in the private sector. Secondly, the government should revise the 
hourly remuneration rates dating from the beginning of the 70s or more 
than four decades. The rates currently used do not take account of the trend 
of the cost of living, certain goods of first necessity having seen their prices 
multiplied by ten in four decades. It is therefore urgent to adapt this rate to 
the current cost of the life. Lastly, a substantial revalorisation of the basic 
wages of the lecturers which could be brought closer to those of other 
African countries of a comparable level of development.  
 This study opens new prospects for research: the study should be 
extended to all State Universities in Cameroon to confirm or reject some of 
the results obtained in the traditional literature on multiple jobs holding. It 
will be also question of highlighting the duration of the phenomenon by 
lecturers of State Universities and factors which affect this duration. This 
will require the construction of a duration model of moonlighting like those 
of Paxson & Sicherman (1996) or of Kimmel & Conway (2001).   
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Notes 
1  This notion is better known in the university of Douala as the theory of ‘souzism’ 
according to which lecturers of State Universities should improve their living standards by 
seeking for secondary sources of income through income generating activities like 
teaching in private institutions of Higher Education 
2 There are eight State Universities in Cameroon: Yaoundé 1, Yaoundé 2, Douala, Dschang, 
N’Gaoundéré, Buea, Maroua, Bamenda.   
3 In April 2008, there was a riot against hunger in Cameroon. This pushed the government to 
increase the level of salaries in the civil service by about de 20%. 
4 Any activity that is not controlled by the state is classified under the informal sector (The 
black labour-market for example) 
5 The limited financial means was also one of the reasons for choosing two universities only. 
We however will gradually extend the study to the other state universities. 
6  We use odd ratios to facilitate the interpretation of the results by taking just the 
exponential of the coefficient of each variable of the model i.e.  jeβ  
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Appendix  
 
 
 
Table 1. Gender and rank according to the University of Origin 
University 
of origin Rank 
Gender 
Total 
Male Female 
Douala 
Ater6 2 (40%) 3 (60%) 5 (33,33%) 
Assistant lecturer 52 (88%) 7 (12%) 59 (65,56%) 
Senior lecturer 18 (69,2%) 8 (30,8%) 26 (50%) 
Associate professor 4 (100%) 0 4 (36,36%) 
Professor 0 0 0 
Sub Total 1 76 (80,85%) 18 (19,15%) 94 (55%) 
Dschang 
Ater 6 (60%) 4 (40%) 10 (63,67%) 
Assistant lecturer 24 (77,4%) 7 (22,6%) 31 (35,44%) 
Senior lecturer 25 (96,2%) 1 (3,8%) 26 (50%) 
Associate professor 6 (85,7%) 1 (14,3%) 7 (63,64%) 
Professor 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 
 Sub Total 2 62 (82,6%) 13 (17,4%) 75 (45%) 
 TOTAL 138 (81,65%) 31 (19,35%) 169 (100%) 
 Source: adapted from Yamb & Bikoue (2016). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Current wage condition according to gender 
   Your current wage condition seems to you  
Total  
Adequate Inadequate Without opinion 
Gender  
Male  
frequency 25 
18,1% 
90 
65,2% 
23 
16,7% 
138 
81,65% 
Female  
frequency 5 
16,1% 
12 
38,7% 
14 
45,2% 
31 
19,35% 
Total    
 
married 102 
60,4% 
37 
21,9% 
169 
100,0% 
Source: Adapted from Yamb & Bikoue (2016). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Current wage condition according to University of Origin 
 Your current wage condition seems 
Total  
Adequate Inadequate Without opinion 
University of origin  Douala frequency 13 13,8% 63 67,0% 18 19,1% 94 55,62% 
Dschang   
frequency 17 
22,7% 
39 
52,0% 
19 
25,3% 
75 
54,38% 
Total  
 30 
17,8% 
102 
60,4% 
37 
21,9% 
169 
100,0% 
Source: Adapted from Yamb & Bikoue (2016). 
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Table 4. Summary of the variables and their coding 
 N Pourcentage marginal 
Do you regularly practice other activities 
besides lecturing and research in the 
university (Dependent variable (q7)) 
Yes (1) 68 40,2% 
No (0) 101 59,8% 
University of origin (q1) Douala (1) 94 55,6% 
Dschang (0) 75 44,4% 
Administrative function (q3) Yes (1) 30 17,8% 
No (0) 139 82,2% 
sex (q32) male (1) 138 81,7% 
 Female (0) 31 18,3% 
Your pay for activities out of the 
university is (q30) 
not consistent (1) 27 16,0% 
Consistent (0) 142 84,0% 
Highest university qualification (q6) Les than Ph.D.(1) 107 63,3% 
Ph.D. or more (0) 62 36,7% 
Grade (q7) non magistral (1) 157 92,9% 
Magistral (0) 12 7,1% 
Field of the certificate (q10) social/human sciences (1) 125 74,0% 
sciences/technology (0) 44 26,0% 
Your current salary condition is  (q12) Inadequate (1) 139 82,2% 
 Adequate (0) 30 17,8% 
Your weekly lecture load (number of 
hours) is: (q20) 
6h or less (1) 40 23,7% 
More than 6h (0) 129 76,3% 
Number of courses taught per week (q21) less than 3 (1) 83 49,1% 
3 or more (0) 86 50,9% 
Age (q31) 42 years or less (1) 102 60,4% 
More than 42 years (0) 67 39,6% 
matrimonial status q(33) Single (1) 68 40,2% 
 married (0) 101 59,8% 
Number of children taken care of 
(q34) 
Less tha n 5 (1) 134 79,3% 
5 or more (0) 35 20,7% 
Valid 169 100,0% 
missing 0  
Total 169  
Sub-sample 125a  
Source : obtained from survey data results. 
Notes: a.The dependent variable has only the observed value in 114 (91,2%) sub-populations. 
 
Table  5.  Likelihood ratio tests on the variables 
Effect  Criteria of adjustment 
of the model  Likelihood ratio tests 
-2 log-likelihood ratio 
of the reduced model Khi-squared 
degrees of 
freedom Signif. 
Constant  158,323 A ,000 0 . 
Q1= University  171,083 12,760 1 ,000 
q3= administrative function  162,097 3,774 1 ,052 
q6=diploma  158,516 ,193 1 ,660 
q7=rank  160,050 1,727 1 ,189 
q10=speciality  159,111 ,789 1 ,375 
q12=wage in the principal job  158,452 ,129 1 ,719 
q20 = weekly teaching hours 158,828 ,506 1 ,477 
q21 = weekly course load 159,924 1,601 1 ,206 
q30=wage in secondary employment  168,241 9,918 1 ,002 
 q31=age  159,489 1,166 1 ,280 
q32=gender  161,257 2,934 1 ,087 
q33= matrimonial status 158,836 ,514 1 ,474 
q34- child burden 158,346 ,023 1 ,880 
Notes: The Khi-squared statistic is the difference between 2 log-likelihoods- the final model and a 
reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting a variable of the final model. The hypothesis 
is zero if all the parameters of this effect are equal to zero; a. The reduced model is equivalent to the 
final model because the omission of an effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6. Estimation of the parameters of the non parsimonious model 
Do you regularly 
perform other activities 
apart from your activities 
of lecturing and 
research at the 
university B 
std. 
error Wald 
Degrees of 
freedom Signif. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence interval 
for Exp(B) 
Upper 
boundary 
Lower 
boundary 
dsion0 
Yes Constante -1,895 1,129 2,819 1 ,093    
[q1=1,00] 1,521 ,445 11,656 1 ,001 4,575 1,911 10,953 
[q3=1,00] 1,179 ,622 3,590 1 ,058 3,251 ,960 11,011 
[q32=1,00] ,901 ,547 2,712 1 ,100 2,463 ,842 7,202 
[q30=,00] 1,599 ,533 8,988 1 ,003 4,946 1,739 14,066 
[q6=,00] -,185 ,421 ,194 1 ,660 ,831 ,364 1,895 
[q7=,00] -,996 ,766 1,692 1 ,193 ,369 ,082 1,656 
[q10=,00] ,428 ,485 ,779 1 ,378 1,535 ,593 3,974 
[q12=,00] ,177 ,493 ,128 1 ,720 1,193 ,454 3,134 
[q20=,00] -,338 ,476 ,502 1 ,479 ,713 ,280 1,815 
[q21=,00] -,557 ,441 1,596 1 ,207 ,573 ,242 1,359 
[q31=,00] ,507 ,474 1,142 1 ,285 1,660 ,655 4,203 
[q33=,00] -,320 ,446 ,514 1 ,473 ,726 ,303 1,740 
[q34=,00] ,088 ,578 ,023 1 ,880 1,091 ,352 3,387 
 b . . 0 . . . . 
Source : Results obtained from survey data 
Notes: a. The reference modality is No; b. This parameter is set to zero because it is superfluous. 
 
 
Table 7:  Estimates of the parameters of the parsimonious model 
Do you regularly perform 
other activities apart from 
your activities of lecturing 
and research at the 
university B 
Std 
error. Wald 
degrees of 
freedom Signif. Exp(B) 
Confidence interval 95% for 
Exp(B) 
Lower 
boundary 
Upper 
boundary 
dimen
sion0 
aYes Constant -2,707 ,584 21,495 1 ,000    
Douala 
University 
1,600 ,387 17,049 1 ,000 4,953 2,318 10,585 
  . .  . . . . 
Administrat
ive office 
1,110 ,468 5,616 1 ,018 3,033 1,212 7,592 
  . .  . . . . 
Secondary 
income    
not 
consistent 
1,643 ,520 9,971 1 ,002 5,172 1,865 14,343 
  . .  . . . . 
Male gender 1,051 ,525 4,001 1 ,045 2,860 1,021 8,008 
         
Source: Results obtained from the data 
Notes: a. The reference modality is No 
 
Table 8. Information on the adjustment of the model 
Model Model adjustment criteria Likelihood ratio tests 
-2 log likelihood Chi-square Degrees of freedom Signif. 
Constant 207,579    
Final 158,323 49,257 13 ,000 
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